Cynthia Buckley, a professor of sociology at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, assesses threats to geopolitical stability along Russia’s periphery through the Central Eurasian State Capacity Initiative. Buckley spoke with research editor Sharita Forrest about the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Sweden recently joined NATO, ending decades of neutrality. How significant is Sweden’s membership and will other countries likely follow as concern mounts over Russia’s intentions?
After battling a Soviet incursion just before World War II, Finland established neutrality with the former Soviet Union in 1948, later dissolved in 1992. Finland joined the European Union with the associated agreements for shared security in 1995. Sweden, NATO’s newest member, joined the EU in 1995. Both entered NATO, spurred by the invasion of Ukraine and concerned about the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
NATO grew from its initial 12 members to 32 across 10 rounds of enlargement. The entry of Finland and Sweden, which became full members April 4, 2023, and March 7, 2024, respectively, occurred swiftly ahead of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine, countries that are at varying application stages. European concerns over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have sharpened the interests of Ukraine and Georgia in promptly fulfilling membership requirements.
All states of the former USSR, except for Belarus and Russia, joined the NATO Partnership for Peace in the 1990s, signing framework agreements for cooperation. With Ukraine and Moldova expected to pursue EU membership, only Moldova is likely to seek NATO membership formally.
Support for Ukraine has been stalled in the U.S. Congress and become a partisan issue. How does U.S. support in Ukraine shape U.S. security?
The U.S. Department of Defense views support for Ukraine as critical, reflecting increasing geopolitical concerns over Russian expansion into other countries of Eastern Europe, uncertainty in international grain markets, the potential to dismantle international norms concerning the targeting of civilians and healthcare facilities during war, and signaling Russia’s impunity for aggression, setting a dangerous standard for maintaining nuclear deterrence. At the same time, Russia’s confidence in its conventional military abilities wanes, discussions of tactical nuclear strikes increase and internal sources of terrorism rise.
Diminished humanitarian and military assistance to Ukraine has severe and negative implications. Continued support is particularly critical for U.S. soft power within NATO and around the globe. Reputational capital enables the U.S. to convince and influence without resorting to armed conflict. Denigrating that critical resource raises political, economic and military concerns, with likely repercussions for U.S. standing in NATO and relations with the EU.
Current public support for Ukraine remains strong, according to Pew Research Center surveys. Yet, the rising costs of humanitarian and military assistance have prompted pushback in Congress, and discussions between Hungary’s President Viktor Orban and former U.S. President Donald Trump have indicated the intention to cut off funding for Ukraine. Studies indicate support from the U.S. has been substantial, and future estimates for reconstruction needs are several magnitudes larger.
Still, in 2022, military and humanitarian aid from the U.S. to Ukraine stood at just under one-third of 1% of the U.S. gross domestic product. Direct 2022 aid to Ukraine from the U.S. was less than 11% of the funds committed to the U.S. Treasury Department’s Troubled Asset Relief Program bailout program in 2008. The U.S. is the largest bilateral donor, but EU institutions have provided over $15 billion more than the U.S., not including bilateral aid from EU and NATO members, some of which host very sizable Ukrainian refugee populations that would grow rapidly in the absence of military funding.
Former U.S. Representative Adam Kinzinger recently tweeted that Russia had come close to triggering NATO’s Article 5 by firing a missile that exploded near a convoy containing both Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis when they met in Odesa. What happens under Article 5 and does it require unanimous approval from NATO member countries?
NATO is based on collective defense, with Article 5 holding that an attack on one is an attack on all. Article 5 has been invoked only once – after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. – but Russian incursions since 2014 have led to investments in combat readiness. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept identified Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic.”
Hungary may block the unanimous consent required for Article 5. But ordnances straying across borders and close to NATO leaders create a continuing risk.
Poland is calling upon NATO member countries – including the U.S. – to increase their defense spending from 2% to 3% of their gross domestic product amidst reports that Iran and China are supplying missiles and technology to Russia and conducting joint naval exercises with it in the Gulf of Oman. How do those spending targets compare with those of other NATO members?
NATO members are expected to spend 2% of their GDP on defense, and recent agreements have encouraged the targeting of investments in next-generation armaments and technologies. Some members fail to reach the 2% target but may make other contributions to operating budgets or the provision of personnel. The U.S. has long invested much more than the NATO target in our military. Unlike many NATO members, the U.S. is very actively engaged in military activities worldwide, making the comparisons less than clear.
What roles are disinformation/misinformation campaigns playing in the Russia-Ukraine conflict?
Disinformation campaigns are potent weapons, undermining trust in banking, government and healthcare. During the invasion, information insie Ukraine also became highly politicized, with government estimates of casualties only recently appearing in official reports. The number of children abducted from Ukraine since February 2022, using relative reports and available records in Ukraine, was recently estimated to be a total of about 20,000 forcibly taken children, an unthinkable tragedy.
In July of 2023, Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, under International Criminal Court charges, claimed that 700,000 children from Ukraine had been taken into Russia, numbers completely unverified but able to stoke understandable concern and fear in Ukraine. As seen in the Oscar-winning film “20 Days in Mariupol,” disinformation is especially difficult for civilians on or near the front line, who are often misdirected and misled against international agreements and norms.
Ukrainian President Zelensky said that Ukraine’s long game is to reclaim Crimea and four other regions that Russia invaded and annexed in 2014, and both Ukraine and Russia appear to be concentrating forces in Crimea. What is the symbolic and strategic importance of Crimea for each country?
Crimea, home to the Crimean Tatar minority population, historic Yalta and the critical deep water Black Sea port of Sevastopol “joined” Russia after elections widely viewed with skepticism in 2014. As specific regions in eastern Ukraine, Sevastopol and nearby towns were home to primarily Russian-speaking residents. Ukraine does not recognize the 2014 election and continues to show the peninsula on national maps, much like Georgia and its “annexed” regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The peninsula lacked a link to Russia until a bridge to Russia’s Taman Peninsula opened in 2018. Bombed in 2022 and 2023, the bridge remains a security burden for Russia.