A growing insurgency, a disputed election and increased U.S. losses have the Obama administration re-evaluating its strategy in Afghanistan. Bringing democracy to the nation was once a goal of the occupation, but was it ever realistic? José Antonio Cheibub (SHAY-bub) is a professor of political science who studies democracy and the process of democratization. Cheibub addressed the topic in a recent presentation to students, parents and alumni, and then with News Bureau social sciences editor Craig Chamberlain.
You believe the prospects for democracy in Afghanistan are dismal. Why?
First of all, Afghanistan is a very poor country. According to the World Bank, its per capita income in 2008 was $760. This is about 62 times below the U.S. per capita income and 14 times below the world average for that year. What existing research has demonstrated is that, at a per capita income as low as that in Afghanistan, democracies can be expected to live for about eight years, or five years when the economy is not growing. The expected life of a democracy, regardless of its per capita income or wealth, is above 40 years. Democracies do emerge in poor countries, and quite often. And sometimes they even survive in these countries - witness India, for example. But the odds are not good.
Is there anything that favors Afghan democracy?
Afghanistan's prospects for democracy do not improve when we consider other characteristics that may also affect the survival of democratic regimes. Afghanistan is an ethnically fragmented country, with an Islamic culture, whose population's allegiances are to clans and tribes rather than to the nation. It has a history of colonialism and foreign invasion, and has chosen a presidential (versus parliamentary) system, a type of regime that many people think tends to lead to crisis and the eventual breakdown of democracy - the U.S. being the glaring exception. It is located in what some have called a "bad" neighborhood where there are no democratic neighbors the country can emulate. And, finally, it is in the middle of a brutal insurgency, the end of which is not yet in sight. I do not know of a single case of successful democratization in the middle of a civil war.
Some of these factors may or may not have an impact on Afghanistan's democratization. There are many good arguments and studies, for instance, showing that the lack of democracy in Islamic countries has nothing to do with their religion. With the exception of insurgency, only the level of economic development or wealth really matters.
But what is interesting is that, whether their effect is large or small, Afghanistan is on the "wrong" side of a long list of things that political scientists have considered to affect democratization. There is not one mitigating aspect that provides a positive outlook. And note that I am not even mentioning the added issues raised by the interrelated factors of the drug trade and terrorism.
When do you know you have democracy?
Democratization entails two processes: one is the establishment or the emergence of democracy; the other is the survival of democracy, once it has been established. Democracy emerges for all sorts of reasons, but the factors that bring it about may be different from the factors that sustain it. Democracy emerges when political actors decide that the choice of who is going to rule the country will proceed through competitive or contested elections. Democracy is sustained or survives when those political actors choose to abide by the results of the election and, after the agreed-upon term expires, choose to allow another competitive election, and, following that election, choose to abide by the results, and so on. The most important event in a democracy is the moment after elections are held, the results are announced, and those who occupy office leave and pass the keys to those who have been newly elected.
Why is democracy in poor countries so frail?
The reason has nothing to do with any cultural proclivities of politicians in poor countries, any lack of knowledge or experience on their part, or the lack of political cunning. It is not that political actors in poor countries "just do not get it," or are "used" to violence, or do not have what it takes to live under a democracy.
Consider that one way to interpret elections is to think of them as a contest for the ability to decide how income in a given country will be distributed. In every election, those who take part in it must decide between two choices. They can choose to comply with the verdict of the election, in which case they will get only a share of the income, or they can decide to fight to become the dictator and decide alone how income will be distributed. If they decide to fight and are successful, they will get everything that is at stake.
In poor countries, the incentives for the political actors are such that they will more often choose to fight. This stems from two economic facts: The value of an extra dollar is smaller for those who already have many dollars, and recovery from the physical destruction that comes with fighting is faster in poor than in rich countries. Therefore, in poor countries the value of becoming a dictator is relatively high, and the costs of fighting are relatively low; in wealthy countries, the gain from getting all rather than only a part of the income is relatively small, and the cost of fighting to become a dictator is relatively high.
What can be done, realistically, to promote democracy in other countries?
In the olden days of the cold war, many people believed that one could get to democracy indirectly: by providing development aid to dictators, which would sow the conditions for democracy to emerge. As we know, that did not work. Today there seems to be an understanding among donor countries and international organizations that the only way to support democracy is to support those actors and practices that are compatible with democracy.
This means programs that seek to promote civil society organizations, create or strengthen independent political parties, professionalize legislative bodies, strengthen the judiciary, help with the administration of elections, and so on. They give funds to non-governmental organizations rather than to governments and emphasize the training of local personnel.
I believe those kinds of programs are the only viable strategy in Afghanistan, even if underfunded and likely to fail. Afghanistan is a poor country and democracy does not last very long in poor countries. Economic development is important, but we cannot wait for it to take place for democracy to be instituted. But while we wait, the country still needs to be governed. And doing a little bit, accepting setbacks but consolidating small gains, is better than nothing.