Asef Bayat is a sociology professor and the Catherine and Bruce Bastian Professor of Global and Transnational Studies at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign with expertise in global social movements and revolutions in the Middle East. A native of Iran, Bayat spoke with News Bureau research editor Sharita Forrest about the mass protests currently erupting throughout that country.
Some experts are saying that the civil unrest and the Islamic Republic of Iran’s brutal crackdown on protestors is evidence that the clerical government’s power is waning and predict it could collapse altogether. Does that appear to be the case and do you foresee regime change as the outcome?
There is little doubt that the Islamic Republic is a highly repressive, corrupt and incompetent system facing multiple structural crises, including energy shortages, decaying infrastructure, environmental degradation, inflation, currency devaluation and a broad economic downturn.
U.S.-imposed sanctions have certainly contributed to these problems, but the crisis runs much deeper. At its core lies a chronic failure of governance rooted in structural corruption, which systematically sidelines competence in favor of ideological commitment and political loyalty to the regime.
At the same time, the Islamic Republic differs in important ways from the shah’s regime and from many comparable authoritarian systems. It is an ideological regime born of a popular revolution in 1979, and it has constructed parallel institutions alongside those it inherited from the prerevolutionary state. Together, these institutions constitute a powerful “deep state” operating under the authority of the supreme leader, who is not accountable to elected bodies such as the presidency or parliament, even though those bodies themselves are subject to strict vetting and supervision.
Over time, the regime has also produced its own “people”: families of the Revolutionary Guard members, Basij vigilantes, state functionaries and operators of countless organizations, shrines, mosques and foundations. These groups benefit from political and economic rents in exchange for their allegiance to the “system.” This constituency is therefore likely to defend the regime — violently if necessary — against mass opposition.
Historical experience with ideological regimes, particularly in Eastern Europe, suggests that such systems tend to “age,” lose legitimacy, expire and eventually shift course through partial liberalization before collapsing. A formidable and sustained mass opposition is likely to accelerate this trajectory.
Are the magnitude of the uprisings and world leaders’ threats of potential financial penalties or military intervention over the killing and brutal treatment of protestors pushing Iran’s leaders toward an inflection point where they will negotiate solutions or make meaningful reforms to stay in power?
The recent episode of mass protest is not new. The Islamic Republic has experienced repeated waves of large-scale protests over the past two decades, including in 2008, 2017, 2019 and 2022.
One might expect an unpopular regime to offer concessions or pursue limited reforms in order to avert total collapse. Yet the regime of Ayatollah Khamenei has consistently refused to do so, largely out of fear that political concessions would embolden the opposition to demand more.
Iran’s uprisings have been remarkable in their size, geographic spread and duration, but they have largely taken the form of networked movements lacking organization, a coherent vision and credible leadership. An organized opposition equipped with a sound alternative and backed by broad constituencies could potentially force the regime to negotiate or implement reforms. Such a movement, however, has been absent.
Only in the current uprising has a leadership figure emerged in the person of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late shah, who has garnered considerable support. However, lacking any political structure inside Iran and refusing to build a coalition with other opposition forces, he has relied almost exclusively on the backing of foreign powers —particularly the United States and Israel.
This reliance has further complicated the situation. Many Iranians seem to support foreign interference out of desperation, but there are also those who oppose military intervention, given the tragedies that followed U.S. interventions in Iraq, Syria and Libya. As a result, opposition to the regime remains deeply divided — an outcome that ultimately benefits the Islamic Republic, allowing it to continue its repression and the massacre of thousands of protesters.
Pahlavi, who is living in exile in the U.S., has voiced support for the protests and vowed he will return to Iran to help it transition to secular democracy. Is there widespread support for Pahlavi’s return and for democratic governance?
There appears to be considerable support for Pahlavi, as evidenced by the current uprising. Much of this support comes from Iranians in the diaspora as well as from large Persian populations in Iran’s central provinces. While some supporters are ideologically committed to his vision, others remain skeptical of his monarchical politics and leadership qualities, yet back him at this stage out of deep resentment toward the Islamic Republic.
At the same time, there are sizeable constituencies — including liberals, democrats, leftists, women’s groups and particularly communities in the peripheries such as Kurds, Azeris, Baluchis and residents of southern Khuzestan — who are not aligned with Pahlavi. Their opposition stems from fears of a return to autocratic monarchy and concerns about his perceived reliance on the United States and Israel. Indeed, those committed to democratic governance often express serious doubts about both the willingness and the capacity of monarchist forces to replace a repressive Islamist regime with a genuinely democratic political order.
