On Jan. 3, the U.S. used an airborne drone to kill Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, one of the most powerful men in Iran. University of Illinois political science professor Nicholas Grossman is the author of “Drones and Terrorism: Asymmetric Warfare and the Threat to Global Security” and specializes in international relations. Grossman discussed the implications with News Bureau social sciences editor Craig Chamberlain.
Is there any precedent for using drones to kill such a high-ranking official? Could this signal a change in how nations might consider using them in the future?
The drone-strike killing of Suleimani was unprecedented. Since the American drone campaign began shortly after 9/11, the United States has focused on terrorists and insurgents, but Suleimani was a senior member of a state military. No country has used a drone to try to kill a state political or military leader – though Venezuelan dissidents tried to use a small drone to kill President Nicolas Maduro in 2018 – and the U.S. has not killed a foreign military leader since World War II.
Drones make targeted killing easier for states, because there’s no risk to a human pilot and the drone can wait longer before firing. It doesn’t need to sleep, eat or use the bathroom. It doesn’t get nervous. Countries such as the U.K., Turkey and Nigeria have followed the United States’ example and used drones to target terrorist leaders. If governments use the Suleimani killing as precedent, it could erode the international norm against assassination.
How is this kind of high-level killing viewed in the context of international relations?
Killing a foreign military leader is serious business, and rare outside of interstate war. By contrast, killing the leader of a terrorist group, such as Osama bin Laden (al Qaeda) or Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (ISIS), is now well-established in international relations. The legal argument is that their groups are actively engaged in warfare, and they fall outside of the Geneva Conventions, which govern how states treat each other.
Suleimani is a special case because, while he was a state military leader, he often acted like a terrorist, helping Iran organize, train and supply terrorist and insurgent groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon. The U.S. designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which Suleimani led, as a terrorist group – the first time the U.S. put part of a state military on that list.
When the U.S. killed Suleimani, he was in Iraq working with Iraqi militias. In addition to Suleimani, the American drone strike killed Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, the leader of an Iraqi group called Kataib Hezbollah, which recently attacked a U.S. military installation, killing an American contractor. The U.S. also accused Suleimani of helping to orchestrate violent demonstrations at the American embassy in Baghdad.
The U.S. drone strike against Suleimani in Iraq expanded the targeting parameters from those of the counterterrorist drone campaign while also arguably falling within the same international law gray area as those strikes.
What might be the broader consequences?
Iran expressed anger but limited its overt retaliation to some missile strikes on U.S.-Iraqi military installations that did not cause any casualties, and both Iran and the U.S. seem content to walk back from the brink. For now. But the larger U.S.-Iran tensions that flared up after President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal and imposed sanctions will continue.
The biggest consequence might be seen in Iraq, where the U.S. military operates with Iraqi permission as part of the campaign against ISIS. The Iraqi parliament already passed a mostly symbolic resolution calling for the U.S. to leave. If Iraq officially demands total American withdrawal, it would represent a geopolitical gain for Iran.
Editor’s note:
To reach Nicholas Grossman, call 516-698-4117; email ng81@illinois.edu; Twitter: @ngrossman81.
For more on his book and research:
How are drones changing warfare, threatening security?
